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THE RISE AND FALL OF PORTLAND'S WATERFRONT
1850-1920

On a cold, dark night in December, 1853, a group of businessmen sat down to a sumptuous meal at Lancaster Hall in Portland, Maine. They had gathered to celebrate the arrival of an English cargo-carrying steamship, the *Sarah Sands*, in the city's harbor. The officers of Her Majesty's vessel, resplendent in the uniforms of the world's greatest maritime power, drank toasts to the assemblage. Swinging gracefully at its mooring, the *Sarah Sands* provoked a wave of excited talk in Portland, for it was not just a chance visitor. It had been sent by its English owners to inaugurate regular steamship service between Portland and Liverpool, a British city considered by most nineteenth-century businessmen to be the commercial and industrial capital of the world. Public displays of joyous optimism at that dinner sharply contrasted with the feelings of gloom shared by Portlanders a few years earlier when their town had been called a "deserted village."¹

The celebration in late 1853 marked the completion of a plan of economic growth launched in the late 1840s and based upon Portland's commodious harbor and its geographical proximity to North Atlantic trade routes. The plan was the brainchild of a native of Maine known far and wide for his fountain of words, his inexhaustible energy, and his fearsome temper. John Alfred Poor, a lawyer then in his forties, had conceived it, promoted it in a score of pamphlets, helped raise the money for it, and guided its implementation. While still a youth Poor had caught sight of one of America's first locomotives during a visit to Boston. Nearly overwhelmed by this marvel, his



John A. Poor, 1808-1871

active mind and fertile imagination soared into a new orbit.² Annually the St. Lawrence River froze over, and he saw no reason why Maine's largest city should not become the winter port of Canada during those months when Montreal was locked in ice. When in 1845 the United States Congress decided to permit goods destined for British North America to pass through this country free of duty, Poor and a small group set out to build a railway

between Portland and Montreal. After an incredible mid-winter journey in a blinding snowstorm through the White Mountains, Poor arrived in Montreal just ahead of Boston merchants intent upon garnering this trade for their own city. Montreal businessmen were persuaded by Poor to build a rail line to the United States border, while Portlanders constructed the American portion of what was soon called the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad. To provide locomotives and rolling stock, Poor founded the Portland Company. After surmounting a succession of obstacles the first engine traveled over these rails in 1853.³ Fortunately for Portland's nearly bankrupted promoters, the line was immediately incorporated into British North America's chief transportation system, the Grand Trunk Railway (GTR). Thus by the end of 1853 Portlanders saw much to cheer them. Their city had been linked by ribbons of steel to the fertile and prosperous Great Lakes region of North America. Mechanics at the Portland Company were turning out scores of locomotives. A newly organized Board of Trade began to promote Portland's commercial and industrial potential based upon "the natural advantages of the port." Commercial Street was laid out at Poor's direction and a marginal railway built linking the waterfront to the new railway. Harbor commissioners were appointed to supervise the construction of wharves. A new reciprocal trade treaty between British North America and the United States appeared to make "the commercial interests of Canada and Maine identical."⁴

The waterfront seemed pivotal to all those who thought about Portland's future in those days. The port was a half-day closer to Liverpool than Boston and possessed a full day's advantage over New York City. Its nearly nine miles of ocean frontage, its relatively deep entrance, its ease of access in tides, and its shelter from storms gave the city an enviable resource, and now the Grand Trunk Railway promised to bring the vast wealth of the North



Commercial Street, Portland, c. 1875

American continent to the intersection of Fore and India streets. "The future of Portland," Poor wrote, "depends upon its ability to secure the bulk of [this] trade."⁵ Three years after the *Sarah Sands* weighed anchor, Portland's city fathers gladly spent \$60,000 to build two piers long enough to receive the *Great Eastern*, the largest steamship ever built at that time. Although the ship never docked at Portland, the waterfront remained central to the city's growth over the next fifty years as far as most residents were concerned. During a single day in the early 1900s, Portlanders sometimes counted nearly a score of freighters docked along the city's 2 million feet of privately-owned wharves, taking on or unloading freight, purchasing valuable supplies and services, and giving work to many hundreds of the city's residents.⁶

But not today. Apart from the summer ferry to Yarmouth and an occasional tanker, virtually no ships call at Portland nowadays. What happened? Few historians are known to have looked into this question. The standard answers are found in the prefaces to reports promoting various schemes for Portland's development. They suggest that the city's waterfront commerce plummeted when the government of Canada decided to use Halifax and Saint John rather than Portland as winter ports of the Dominion. They imply that the major decisions on Portland's waterfront were made in Ottawa rather than in Portland, and Mainers had little to say about it.⁷

A false "common sense" often misleads people into believing that whatever happened in the past was inevitable, but historians are usually less willing than planners to accept that notion. One of the ways they assess the relative inevitability of a past occurrence is by comparing it with other events in a similar circumstance. In order to better understand the evolution of Portland's waterfront this paper will compare its history with that of Saint John, New Brunswick, one of Portland's major rivals


for Canada's winter port trade. The two ports are eminently comparable for the period of 1850 to 1920; both had large, ice-free harbors close to North Atlantic shipping lanes. They contained approximately the same number of people in the mid-nineteenth century, and in the following decades they experienced similar patterns of economic growth.⁷ In 1895 Saint John began developing its harbor facilities and challenged Portland's monopoly as a winter port of Canada. By the 1920s it had emerged with the lion's share of this business. A comparison of decisions by merchants and civic elites in Portland and Saint John ought to shed some light on the reasons for the decline of port activities in Portland and the extent to which this falloff was a result of local decisions or external forces.

The views of merchants in both cities are readily obtained from the records of their respective boards of trade.⁸ They show that Portland's civic and business leaders actually neglected their harbor at a critical moment during the first decades of this century when Saint John merchants challenged Portland's control over the winter port trade. Instead of modernizing Portland's waterfront, merchants linked their city's future to tourism, retailing, and manufacturing. Unlike people residing in other Canadian or American port cities, Portlanders failed to invest any public funds in their harbor facilities until they were required to do so by Congress in 1917. By that time their response was too little and too late. On the other hand, Saint John business leaders had obtained funds from their City Hall and from Ottawa to build wharves, warehouses, breakwaters, and a dry dock in the crucial years around the First World War. As a result, Saint John's bustling, modern, and prosperous harbor is the third largest port in Canada today, while Portland's waterfront continues to decay. The weight of historical evidence suggests that these contrasting outcomes were not merely

the consequence of forces beyond either city's boundaries, but also resulted from decisions made by Portland and Saint John civic and business elites at the turn of the century.

Long after John Poor's death in 1871, Portlanders remained captivated by his vision. The city used its credit to carry out his plans, and trade boomed following the completion of the Grand Trunk system, which stretched from Portland to Chicago. The city's first grain elevator, capable of holding 175,000 bushels, was constructed with local bank funds in 1875. Two steamship lines subsidized by the Canadian government provided fortnightly service from Portland to Liverpool during the winter months. Exports to Europe consisted primarily of western grain and Maine apples, whereas sugar, molasses, and coal dominated the list of imports. But there were problems as well, and even those Portlanders especially prone to flights of fancy began to wonder if their city would ever surpass Boston. The recurring absence of sufficient inbound cargo made it less economical for steamers to stop at Portland than at more diversified ports on the American east coast despite the Maine city's greater proximity to Europe. The GTR also found it hard to persuade ships to call at Portland because of its inadequate terminal facilities, and the dollar value of both exports and imports dropped substantially during the 1880s. For instance, only one steamer a week could be loaded at the grain elevator. Portland merchants appointed a committee to confer with the Grand Trunk, but they apparently did not take the problem to city officials.¹⁰

When the Dominion's first transcontinental railway, the Canadian Pacific (CPR), neared completion in the 1880s, Portland merchants tried to make their city its eastern terminus, anticipating that it would "soon drop into our lap . . . not only the rich territory that it traverses from the Pacific to the Atlantic, but a trade of untold wealth from



Grand Trunk Elevator, c. 1903

the Pacific isles and Japan and China.” If the CPR joined the GTR on Commercial Street, the Board of Trade concluded, “there will be no need then to coax great ocean steamships to come to this port.” Portland merchants and civic elites obviously still accepted Poor’s dictum that the waterfront was central to the city’s prosperity.¹¹

Nevertheless port expansion lagged behind expectations throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, and merchants debated what they could do to improve the situation. Some concluded that more waterfront storage capacity was needed; others spoke of the need for public investment. At a Board of Trade banquet in 1889, Mayor Charles T. Chapman suggested that steamship lines be granted a subsidy to stop at Portland. If they did this, he declared, “all the . . . elevator

and wharf facilities will be forthcoming, for Western grains and products will come here naturally seeking trans-shipment abroad.”¹² But Portlanders appeared unwilling themselves to offer an inducement to the steamship companies, and the mayor’s assertions remained untested. City business reports expressed even more gloom after the advent of a worldwide depression in 1893. Only sixteen steamers were booked for Portland during the 1896 winter season, less than half the number that had called at the city in 1887. The Portland Company ordered a 60 percent reduction in its ship crews and cut the wages of those remaining by 10 percent.¹³

The arguments trumpeting Portland’s advantages over Boston and New York could be used equally well by Saint John civic and business leaders competing for the lucrative North Atlantic trade. Its spacious harbor was even closer to Liverpool than Portland’s, and after 1876 it was also linked by rail to Montreal by way of the Intercolonial Railway (ICR). Hopes that the ICR would enable Saint John’s factories to sell wares throughout the continent failed to materialize, however, and by the 1880s civic elites desperately sought some antidote for the city’s stagnation.¹⁴ At this point Saint John’s elected representatives in Parliament used their votes to insure that the Canadian Pacific would terminate at Saint John rather than at Portland. Thus the 482-mile “Short Line” was constructed across northern Maine in the late 1880s helping Saint John to even the scorecard. Being only 243 miles away, Portland was still closer than Saint John to Montreal, of course, but the New Brunswick port had improved its position significantly regarding freight charges.¹⁵

Saint John leaders relied upon several favorable external circumstances helping them to boost the city’s waterfront business. The last two decades of the

nineteenth century witnessed England's expansion to the far reaches of the globe. Queen Victoria reigned over an empire that inspired millions of her subjects, and they gave her name to an era. None were more loyal than the mass of English-speaking Canadians. They gloried in Britain's exploits and looked forward to the day when all parts of the empire would be federated into a worldwide Anglo-Saxon union. As Carl Berger has observed, at this time British imperialism was a potent form of Canadian nationalism. In an international atmosphere of exorbitant flag-waving and sabre-rattling, the Union Jack fluttered from the tall masts of fast, new British liners crisscrossing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Like government-owned airlines in many countries today, fast steamships at the turn of the century commanded prestige that was believed to enhance national reputations as well as to open profitable new trade channels.¹⁶

Unfortunately for Canadians, Britain's fast new steamers docked at New York City rather than at Halifax or Saint John during the winter months when the St. Lawrence was frozen, provoking both government and business leaders in Canada to talk of starting a "Fast Atlantic Service" between Liverpool and Canadian ports. These ships were expected to follow projected "All-Red" routes that linked the various parts of the British Empire by steamship, railway, and cable connections and promised to make the Imperial ideal become a reality for British subjects scattered across the globe. It was endorsed by growing numbers of British officials who feared the German kaiser's expansionist designs and sought some means of girding the empire's defenses. Only government assistance, they realized, could persuade hard-nosed steamship managers to abandon the more profitable Liverpool-New York route. The Canadian government already provided an annual mail subsidy, and the

anticipated benefits in prestige, trade, and immigration from a Fast Atlantic Service whetted the appetites of both businessmen and politicians in the Maritime provinces. By the 1890s, then, considerable support had surfaced in Canada and Britain for a subsidized steamship service.¹⁷

But who would pay for the subsidy? And which cities would be favored? After several years of jockeying between the British and Canadian governments, and also between the Maritime provinces and Ottawa, a number of deals were finally concluded. Both Saint John and Halifax joined Portland as winter ports, with the New Brunswick city relying upon its new CPR connection to Montreal and Halifax using the government-owned ICR route. Henceforth only the two Canadian ports would receive subsidized mail ships. Portland, of course, continued to depend upon the Grand Trunk Railway to tap its share of the continent's resources. A joint British-Canadian subsidy of \$350,000 for a Fast Atlantic Service was approved, but that deal fell through.¹⁸

All was not lost for Saint John, however, because the government had been responding in part to the demands of Saint John merchants and civic officials under the leadership of W. Frank Hatheway, a talented and resourceful tea merchant who was president of the city's Board of Trade. For months Hatheway had lobbied for a Fast Atlantic Service in the halls of the Canadian Parliament. He went to England and promoted the idea among merchants in Manchester and other British cities. He obtained letters of endorsement from the boards of trade in Quebec City, Toronto, and Winnipeg. Despite the government's hesitancy Hatheway continued talking to the steamship companies, and he finally persuaded one of them to make a definite offer. In late 1895 Ottawa finally agreed to subsidize a slower and cheaper winter service between Saint John and Liverpool by the Beaver Line for

\$25,000. While this was not as grandiose as a Fast Atlantic Service, it was sufficient for Saint John civic and business leaders to pat themselves on the back. The Board of Trade's annual report left little doubt about the Canadian winter port's decidedly political origins.¹⁹

Yet the struggle was not over, because Ottawa's subsidies were only granted on a yearly basis. To make their port more competitive, the New Brunswickers strove to improve relations with the local longshoremen's unions. They lobbied in Ottawa for the much more costly Fast Atlantic Service; they echoed the CPR's perennial demand for more freight routed through Saint John; and they badgered the minister of public works about dredging the harbor. They entered negotiations for a dry dock to be financed by a consortium of imperial, federal, provincial, and city governments. On these occasions Saint John leaders touted a card that Portlanders could not play. Shortly after the CPR Short Line had been completed, the city had borrowed money to build wharves, to erect a one-million bushel grain elevator, and to finance dredging. After the Beaver Line contract had been signed, the city practically doubled its wharf and warehouse facilities at the CPR terminal. By 1904 Saint John taxpayers had spent three-quarters of a million dollars on port improvement, and city fathers could reasonably claim to have made an extraordinary financial effort to create a modern port facility.²⁰ Local leaders used this card to prevent Ottawa from canceling annual subsidies to steamship lines. For example, when the government's commitment wavered in 1900, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier was told that Saint John residents were "amazed and incredulous" that Ottawa would cancel the subsidies after the city had made enormous financial sacrifices on a port "which they consider vital to their future welfare." Exports had risen from \$3 million in 1895 to \$11 million by 1900, they observed, and any weakening of support by

Laurier would “stir up angry and regrettable agitation.” By then Ottawa was underwriting winter steamship service between Saint John and Liverpool, Glasgow, Dublin, Belfast, and London.²¹

Throughout this crucial period of port development, the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Saint John City Council, and the Board of Trade worked together to improve the port and promote its business. They circulated pamphlets throughout Canada and Britain touting Saint John’s new waterfront facilities. They persuaded Ottawa to underwrite regular steamship service between Saint John and the West Indies. They lobbied to become the eastern terminus of yet another Canadian transcontinental railway. These efforts seemed to be rewarded in 1906 when the Canadian Pacific Railway finally won the long-discussed contract to provide fast steamship service between Canadian and British ports. Two sleek new twenty-knot ships, the *Empress of Britain* and the *Empress of Ireland*, regularly docked at Saint John during the winter months after that year. So glamorous were they that even some Americans came to Canada just to sail to Europe on the *Empresses*.²²

In the same year a royal commission appointed to study Canada’s future transportation needs visited Saint John and blessed the local undertakings. The commissioners noted the extent to which local officials had built up Saint John’s port facilities and called upon Ottawa to take over the waterfront, build additional wharves, and commence further dredging and breakwater construction. Although the recommendation to nationalize the port was not carried out at this time, the commissioners made clear that the city’s winter port activities deserved continued government assistance.²³ By then Saint John’s winter exports had climbed to \$23 million as compared to Portland’s \$28 million in 1904. The harbor commanded

New Brunswick's attention to such an extent that nearby mines began marketing their coal under the "Winter Port" label. Clearly, Saint John had broken Portland's monopoly on Canada's winter port business.²⁴

Saint John's challenge to Portland was partially obscured by a tremendous increase in Canada's foreign trade at the turn of the century. From the mid-1890s to the First World War, Canadians enjoyed an unprecedented economic boom. "I've been coming to Portland for over twenty years," said one captain in the British steamer service, "and I never saw the like" of Portland's waterfront business.²⁵ Freight sheds seemed ready to burst with merchandise, railway cars clogged Grand Trunk sidings, and timekeepers rushed around the GTR wharves night and day, trying to keep track of crews of longshoremen. A record fifty-four steamers departed from Portland in 1897, and a thousand railway cars filled with grain could be counted in the freight yards at dockside. Under the supervision of the GTR's dynamic new manager, Charles M. Hays, the railway and its Portland wharves acquired a new lease on life. In 1896-97 a new grain elevator capable of holding 1.25 million bushels of prairie wheat dominated Portland's waterfront skyline and was joined by a second elevator a few years later. The Grand Trunk extended its wharves, laid new track, built new stockyards at East Deering, and placed new rolling stock in service. Sometimes three huge steamships docked at the same time at the Grand Trunk wharves. Everyone from harbor pilots to grocers, butchers, lumber dealers, hotel proprietors, and longshoremen benefited from the increased port business. Merchants concluded that Portland would grow in size and importance "as a direct result of this enterprise of the Grand Trunk," and they predicted year-round steamship service from Portland to English ports within a few years. They gladly entertained

Hays at a banquet and concluded that he was “the right man in just the right place.”²⁶

If good times might have obscured the need for coordinated public and private planning and development, bad times provoked worry and an occasional reassessment. During the 1899/1900 winter season, six steamship lines dispatched a record total of ninety-three steamers from Portland to Liverpool, London, Glasgow, Bristol, Antwerp, and Hamburg. These ships spent an average of \$1.5 million for labor and stores.²⁷ The bulk of goods leaving Portland consisted of apples, cheese, flour, meats, canned goods, cattle, and sheep, while imports consisted mostly of bleaching powder and china clay used in the paper industry, and iron, sugar, salt, and coal. The dollar value of the port’s exports rose from \$28.6 million in 1899 to \$47.5 million in 1901, while imports climbed from \$5.8 million to \$9.3 million during the same period. At one point the British consul in Portland counted twenty-nine ocean-going steamers in the harbor, twenty-six of them carrying British registry. The figures in the table below chronicle the growth of traffic and tonnage. But they also suggest that port business could take a sudden turn for the worse. In fact, grain exports dropped over 50 percent during the winter of 1901/02. While exports exceeded \$31 million in 1906, they fell during the business recession of 1907-1909. Imports still lagged behind exports.²⁸ Was Portland beginning to feel the competition from Saint John for Canada’s winter port business? A few Portlanders thought so and concluded that the city ought to take charge of its waterfront. The *Board of Trade Journal* warned that “powerful influences” were working to divert Portland’s trade “to other ports showing greater local interest.”²⁹ The board appointed a special committee to formulate a plan for the harbor in order to get Congress’s attention. But most city leaders remained content to let the Grand Trunk Railway make all

the effort and shoulder all the expenses; no plan was forthcoming and no city wharves or warehouses were built.³⁰ Portlanders had shown more interest in the 1850s in accommodating the *Great Eastern* than in servicing the ships that regularly called at the turn of the century.

PORTLAND'S WINTER PORT BUSINESS
1897/98-1901/02

Date	No. Steamers	Net Tonnage
1897/98	85	222,016
1898/99	88	227,641
1899/00	93	238,467
1900/01	103	286,168
1901/02	57	168,828

SOURCE: *BTJ* 15 (February 1903): 305.

When Portland businessmen and civic leaders did seek public assistance, they knocked on the doors of Congress rather than at City Hall. Since the 1830s the Army Corps of Engineers had been overseeing the construction of breakwaters and dredging of the harbor and Back Bay. In 1896 Congress agreed to expand this effort considerably by authorizing excavation of the harbor to a depth of thirty feet at low tide. By 1902 nearly 4 million cubic yards had been removed by the contractors, enabling the largest steamships to use Portland Harbor and smaller vessels to dock at Back Bay.³¹ The Maine congressional delegation also obtained several navigational aids for harbor approaches. Working through the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, a lobbying agency, Board of Trade

officials persuaded the government to station a ship nearby to destroy derelict vessels, but failed to obtain a dry dock. In 1901 the board pressed for greater fortification of the harbor, a strategy which they expected would lead to the posting of many troops in the vicinity. Within two years, over \$1 million had been spent by the War Department to construct or improve Ft. Williams at Portland Head, Ft. McKinley on Great Diamond Island, Ft. Levett on Cushing's Island, and Ft. Preble on the Cape Elizabeth shore. The thousand-odd artillerymen assigned to these installations benefited the local economy; their batteries of ten-inch and twelve-inch mortars provided Portlanders with one of the most fortified harbors in the nation. No one was quite sure from whom Portlanders were being protected, but these new forts – along with a new lightship, a new \$200,000 revenue cutter, and a new \$40,000 immigration quarantine station – testified to the political clout of Thomas B. Reed, Nelson Dingley and other Mainers in Congress.³² Yet these piecemeal gifts failed to compare with the coordinated program of port expansion and development that had been launched by private and public enterprise in Saint John. A few Portland merchants, noting the absence of large, modern, fireproof wharves in their harbor, concluded that such improvements were unlikely to be made until the city took over its waterfront as other cities had done. But the majority of business and civic leaders turned elsewhere for keys to Portland's future.³³

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, tourists began to pay regular summer visits to Maine. Steamers plying the waters between Boston, New York City, and Portland began to deposit thousands of visitors in hotels and cottages on the shores of Casco Bay and Cape Elizabeth. In 1888 the *Board of Trade Journal* declared that Maine was becoming known “as the playground of the

nation.”³⁴ By the turn of the century this stream had grown into a torrent of 200,000 visitors who spent somewhere between \$10 million and \$50 million in this state. Portland officials began to look at their own city with a tourist’s eye.³⁵ They criticized the “rubbish and weeds” on the walks along some city promenades, or the “unfinished appearance” of and “rowdy vandalism” in Deering Oaks Park. With unconscious humor they complained of a “long-felt need” for public urinals in downtown Portland. They worried about the bad image created by newspaper stories detailing crime in city streets.³⁶ The Board of Trade helped inaugurate an annual Old Home Week to lure Maine natives back for a visit, organized trolley tours of Portland, and persuaded the school board to offer a summer session for cottagers’ children. Portland merchants distributed a city shopping guide to all resorts within a fifty-mile radius and urged their fellow citizens to sustain Portland’s “good reputation for warm hospitality” in order to counter the attractions at Old Orchard Beach and Bar Harbor.³⁷

The advent of tourist promotion in Maine coincided with the phenomenal growth of advertising media throughout the nation. As large businesses began competing in national markets, they manufactured brand-name goods that they sold directly to retailers rather than to wholesale houses. Advertising agencies soon sprang up to market these products and the technique spread to the merchandizing of tourism and other services.³⁸ In 1903 the *Board of Trade Journal* published its first full-page advertisement “selling” Portland to tourists. Not surprisingly the blurb quoted extensively from Longfellow’s essay on Portland:

‘... a city wherein the standard of intellectuality, refinement, morality, thrift, enterprise, and similar qualities, is exceptionally high.’

TOURISTS! By all means stop at Portland, Maine, the Cleanest and Healthiest City in America³⁹

In 1906 Portland merchants created a new standing committee on advertising at the Board of Trade, and raised \$3,000 that year to market the city's virtues as a tourist center. In subsequent years thousands of booklets promoted the city's hotel, dining, and recreational facilities, also assured timid strangers that Portland was an "orderly city" and with "no objectionable element" – that is, no "lawless" immigrant class. Even the *Board of Trade Journal* changed its image, becoming a glossy magazine filled with large pictures and articles on such subjects as "Sights in Portland and Where to See Them," "Maine – the Yachtsman's Paradise," "Hotel and Resort Notes," and "With the Automobilists."⁴⁰

Whether because of advertising, the scenery, or the cool breezes, nearly every year subsequent to 1900 brought a larger number of tourists to Portland. Three-quarters arrived by rail at the city's Union Station, and during August over a hundred Pullman cars were counted every day. Direct train service from New York City was inaugurated. Not surprisingly, the flood of tourists began to make an indelible impression on the Forest City. New hotels sprang up; new summer playhouses, motion picture theatres, and bowling halls appeared. Even the annual maneuvers at Ft. Williams were now billed as a tourist attraction. A growing number of affluent visitors arrived in new-fangled automobiles, and a few Portland hotels began catering especially to them. Auto repair and servicing centers opened. An estimated 6,000 auto enthusiasts visited Portland in 1910, staying until October before heading to the nearby fall foliage in the interior. The Board of Trade launched a campaign to get city and state roads improved, focusing especially on the Kittery-to-Portland "trunk line" which was in very poor condition. Merchants also noted the absence of up-to-date sign posts on Maine roads, a situation which undoubtedly

gave birth to countless stories about Maine farmers advising tourists how to get from “hea’” to “thea’”⁴¹

The new emphasis on tourism could be seen on Commercial Street as well as on Congress Street. Graceful yachts, their sails billowing in the harbor breezes, dominated the waterfront during the summer months. Warships from both the British and American fleets paid summer courtesy calls to Portland, fascinating both the natives and the tourists alike. In response to these guests the city in 1905 finally obtained ownership of a small piece of waterfront property to construct a landing for both military and civilian sailors.⁴²

Why did tourism rather than the winter port trade capture the imagination of Portland’s civic and business leaders? Tourist dollars seemed to be more evenly distributed throughout the business community. It was well nigh impossible, merchants declared, “to name a branch of trade that has not been directly or indirectly benefited by our ever-increasing summer tourist business,” which was believed to be worth a million dollars a year to Portland. While this amount was only two-thirds of the estimated annual winter port benefits, tourism was thought to have a more positive effect on property values.⁴³ Moreover, it was easier for civic leaders to quantify the beneficial effects of this wonderful new “industry,” and, consequently, they were able to generate more public support for it. Tourists beating a path to Board of Trade rooms on Exchange Street were avidly counted year after year. Portland’s trolleys transported one million more passengers in 1910 than five years before, and Casco Bay steamers carried 300,000 more people in 1910 than just a year earlier. Hotel managers and retailers frequently reported “remarkable” increases in business, “We reap a benefit from these visitors,” they concluded, adding: “they gain in health and we in wealth.”

Merchants also believed that tourist promotion efforts helped allay rural peoples' suspicions of Portland city slickers. Thus Portlanders enthusiastically endorsed efforts to promote tourism while leaving the winter port business in the care of Grand Trunk Railway officials.⁴⁴

Tourism also helped to lift the sights of Portland retailers beyond their city's limits. As chambermaids and waitresses from Kittery to Bar Harbor began to adopt the styles of Maine's more affluent summer visitors, merchants experienced a greater demand for fashionable and expensive goods.⁴⁵ Setting out to win business that had formerly gone to Boston or even New York City, they decided to promote Portland as a retail distribution center for northern New England and adjacent areas of Canada. In the spring of 1911 they chartered a special train to take them to Aroostook County, where they hoped to make new business acquaintances and, "incidentally," exploit Portland "as a live commercial city."⁴⁶ Boston might have larger stores, they boasted, but not better ones than Portland. They even journeyed beyond the state's borders to New Hampshire, Vermont, and Quebec City, and laid plans for a national tour. In the spring of 1915 the merchants reorganized into a chamber of commerce and broadened their journal to reflect the commercial interests of the whole state. Each month a Maine city or town was celebrated in prose and photographs. Thanks to these efforts, Portland merchants expected their city to become the crown jewel for the surrounding coronet of Maine municipalities, "each having its own separate interests, but finding Portland a common center."⁴⁷

As part of the campaign to promote retail sales, merchants drummed up the convention business. In 1902 nine different conventions were held in Portland, "leaving large sums of money and aiding greatly in advertising our city abroad."⁴⁸ That year the WCTU's national gathering

brought 500 delegates, and in succeeding years such groups as the commercial travelers, the Maine State Pomological Society, the Maine Seed Improvement Association, and the Maine Dairymen's Association also convened in Portland. The largest were the Maine State Grange, which usually attracted 3,000 visitors, and the state teachers' association. In 1912 over 4,000 educators packed Portland's brand-new city hall auditorium which had been built specifically to lure these groups. When the new hall proved too small for increasingly popular automobile shows or music festivals, Portland merchants launched a drive for an exposition building.⁴⁹

In many ways, annual conventions, rural business trips, and tourism shared an obvious common denominator; they all produced the same wonderful jingle of cash register bells. By luring rural Mainers and neighboring New Englanders or Canadians to Portland during the off-season, canny merchants found a way to extend their tourist business beyond the dreaded Labor Day exodus. From their viewpoint funds spent on new street lighting, the new city hall and auditorium, and on the new exposition building – rather than on new wharves and warehouses – made Portland “a city of progressiveness and refinement, and [were] destined to bring much money and popularity to the Forest City.” Thus Portland was no longer merely the winter port of Canada but had become instead the “Metropolis of Maine,” “Queen City of the East,” “Gateway to the summer playground of America,” and the center of commercial enterprise in northern New England.⁵⁰

In addition to these promotions, some Portland civic and business leaders also wanted to make their city into a manufacturing center. This was by no means a new idea, and we have noted how John Poor and his friends founded the Portland Company as part of their

mid-nineteenth-century railway and port development scheme. During the gloomy 1880s, many promoted expanded manufacturing activity as an antidote to the stagnant economy and exodus of Mainers. At that time the Board of Trade demanded “fair play” – meaning lower taxes – for manufacturers. “If the citizens of Portland would put money into business as readily and as freely as they do into amusements,” the *Journal* declared, “our city would very soon realize a substantial boom.”⁵¹

The return of prosperity at the turn of the century resulted in a considerable expansion of Portland’s manufacturing base. While only a few large factories competed in national markets, most other enterprises served the needs of northern New England’s booming pulp and paper, textile, and shoemaking towns. Even the Portland Company stopped making locomotives after 1891 and began to turn out pulp digesters for the paper industry and steam engines and elevators for lumber and textile mills. During the winter it enjoyed a good business repairing the engines of British steamers. As a result of these diversified activities, Portland displaced Lewiston as Maine’s leading manufacturing center.⁵²

In 1909 the Board of Trade decided to step up its promotion of manufacturing, perhaps because its small businesses had proven “practically immune” to the recession of 1907-1909. Merchants had also begun to fear a disproportionate growth of Portland’s tourist-related businesses, and concluded that expanded manufacturing activity would provide a more suitable tax base. They pointed to the absence of any special inducements for businessmen and found city officials guilty of making “practically no effort” to find new industries.⁵³ “The other day,” said one well-known Portland businessman, “I was asked in Boston to tell what Portland does, and I was ashamed to find I knew so little.” Hence, a committee of

the Board of Trade began to drum for factories as it had been advertising for tourists. In 1910 it organized an exposition to display the products of some sixty different industries already in the city. The industrial show was so successful that the board went on to raise funds for the 27,000-square-foot exposition building mentioned earlier, which opened on the outskirts of the city in 1915. To be sure, not all Portlanders joined in this effort. While some looked on smoking chimneys as evidence of prosperity, others merely regarded them as eyesores.⁵⁴

Over the decade from 1910 to 1920 advocates of factories in Portland pointed to some modest gains. The ladies' ready-made clothing industry flourished, a cold storage plant was built on Commercial Street, a modern shoe factory opened on Milk Street, and Burnham & Morrill erected a large new plant on the site of a former shipyard in East Deering. Several paper box companies sprang up to supply the retail trade. The city boasted of 350 factories employing 6,000 hands who produced \$10 million worth of goods. Yet Portland still remained primarily a commercial rather than a manufacturing center. Its hinterland was rather constricted, and its relatively greater distance from the North American industrial heartland increased freight costs for Portland industries competing with those in New York City, Pittsburgh, or Chicago. Low-cost housing for workers remained scarce. The First World War provided some additional stimulus, and in 1917 Portland's new Chamber of Commerce (whose charter gave it authority "to promote business industries and civic ideals") created the city's first planned industrial park on fifty acres of land near the B & M plant. Thus manufacturing joined tourism, retailing, and convention business as the major elements in Portland's new development strategy. Clearly, the harbor and winter port trade had lost favor, and the city's

waterfront was no longer deemed as vital to Portland's future as it had been during John Poor's life.⁵⁵

Some people fretted over the consequences of this reordering of priorities. By the century's second decade the harbor was so badly crowded that ships were often forced to anchor in the channel. Although the Grand Trunk rebuilt its Galt Wharf, dredging failed to keep pace with the ever-larger steamships which sometimes could not take on a full cargo. Frustrated Corps of Engineers officials met with merchants "to ascertain [their] wishes and ideas" regarding future port development, pointing to the absence of adequate wharves and warehouses for the new and bigger steamers. One merchant urged the Board of Trade to throw its energies into building "wharves to better accommodate large ships," but the group settled instead upon a petition to Washington for a harbor survey.⁵⁶ Later they schemed to put pressure on the engineers by inviting a congressional committee to inspect Portland's waterfront. This strategy boomeranged: the congressmen considered Portland's private dock facilities "many decades behind the times" and were amazed to find no publicly owned piers. They told merchants that the city should build municipal docks "at any cost" if they wanted their harbor to remain competitive with other ports. They implied that city-owned docks would provide the "strongest argument" for additional federal aid.⁵⁷ A few merchants agreed, absolving the Corps of Engineers of blame for the port's inadequacies, and concluding that Portland had received the help of the federal government "in a spirit . . . worse than indifferent." It had left its harbor unregulated, unprotected, and undeveloped. They found the city's "indifference to our greatest commercial interest" to be intolerable.

We have done absolutely nothing. The city has given more attention to our inspected ash-carts than it has to the harbor.

In November of 1914, the Board of Trade appointed a special committee to petition the city to prepare a public dock area and called attention to the miles of undeveloped shoreline along the Eastern Promenade and in South Portland.⁵⁸

Instead the city moved to regulate its harbor, and for an entirely different reason. Visiting tourists, irate over thefts from their yachts and fuming at residents who regularly dumped their ashes into the harbor, made their grievances well known to local officials. The city bought a powerboat and assigned three men to guard the yachts day and night. The patrols ended on Labor Day. "This harbor is deserving of better treatment," a few merchants complained. Others agreed, but there were not enough dissident voices to force civic action. No municipal docks or warehouses were built on Portland's commercial waterfront. Many citizens seemed more interested in the efforts of Robert E. Peary, the arctic explorer, to persuade the navy to build an air base on an island in Casco Bay.⁵⁹

In 1917 the United States Congress resolved the whole issue. The Corps of Engineers had asked the federal legislature for a "substantial sum" to dredge the channel five feet deeper (to thirty-five feet) and remove three shoals. Just a few weeks after Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war against Germany, a Maine senator attached this bill to an emergency war measure. It passed, of course, but unlike previous bills it demanded some assurance from local officials that "adequate berthing space" would be provided for deep-draft steamships. In other words, the Congress would no longer obligate the Corps of Engineers to dig harbors deeper and deeper for naught. As a result, city elites appealed to the state legislature for assistance and a commission was appointed to investigate their request.⁶⁰

In 1919 the commission filed a report endorsing the need for publicly owned piers.⁶¹ But first the commissioners chronicled the extent to which Portland's waterfront had deteriorated. Most of the forty-six privately owned wharves were constructed on pilings. Few of these old docks were found to be adequate, "and the buildings on many of them seem to be relics of by-gone days." Only the Grand Trunk maintained four modern piers, and even these were "not the latest" in design.⁶² Elsewhere most of the successful seaports were publicly owned or controlled, the commissioners reported, "but neither the State of Maine nor the City of Portland has expended one cent to improve the port facilities of Portland Harbor." Meanwhile Portland's rivals – Boston, Montreal, and Saint John – had already spent millions on harbor improvements. Smaller harbors like Portland needed up-to-date facilities to offset the advantages of larger ports.

If business is once diverted to other ports with better facilities, [it] may be lost to Portland for all time.⁶³

Private enterprise should not be expected to make these improvements, they argued, because the indirect return would accrue to the city and state but not to a company. These arguments persuaded both the legislature and the voters of Maine to float a \$2 million bond issue for the construction of a dock adjacent to the Grand Trunk wharves. In 1922 the new \$1,665,000 Maine State Pier opened for business. The city (which had purchased the site for the pier) and the state had taken the first tardy step toward the modernization of Portland's waterfront. Would it be too late?

As the Maine commissioners had observed, Saint John already had begun upgrading its port facilities.⁶⁴ At the request of local officials, the Canadian government in 1911 began to develop the harbor on the east side of the

city. Parliament appropriated \$500,000 to begin work on a breakwater, dredging, wharves, and a dry dock, and later the government awarded an \$8.9 million contract to complete it. Under terms of the agreement the government took possession of the breakwater and wharves while the private contractor retained control of the dry dock. Work started in 1912, but two-and-one-half years later about all that could be cited was a partially completed breakwater and 2.8 million cubic yards of dredging. The outbreak of the First World War cut off the company from English money markets and all work ceased in November of 1916. Nevertheless, toward the end of the war another contract was granted to a different concern to complete all the port facilities except the wharves. The new installation, including the dry dock, opened in 1923. When these facilities were added to those already in place on the west side of Saint John, it comes as no surprise to learn that Saint John's port activities continued to flourish in the 1920s, while Portland's went into a gradual decline.⁶⁵

The rise of Saint John's waterfront and the fall of Portland's occurred partly from external influences which Canadian officials could exploit if not fully control. Saint John elites took advantage of a virulent English-Canadian sentiment identifying the Canadian nation with strengthened ties to Great Britain. Later, a growing Canadian nationalism occasioned by the country's wartime achievements reinforced Saint John's claim to be a "National Port." Furthermore, Saint John's city fathers adroitly used their political clout in Ottawa. A succession of cabinet ministers from the city voiced Saint John's ambitions at the highest levels of government and various forms of assistance – ship subsidies, money for wharves, dredging, grain elevators, conveyors, and breakwaters – were steadily forthcoming. Finally, when the Canadian government was forced to bail out the Grand Trunk

Railway after the First World War, it became quite clear to Ottawa officials (if not to Portland merchants) that henceforth Saint John rather than Portland would serve the bulk of Canada's winter port needs.

But it is a mistake to assume that the demise of Portland's waterfront was therefore inevitable. In the mid-nineteenth century, John A. Poor had combined public with private capital to launch an ambitious development plan based upon geography and the new railway technology. Railways and steamships transformed the harbor into a functioning if not always flourishing winter port. Enthusiastic merchants and civic leaders built the *Great Eastern* wharves and financed the Grand Trunk Railway's first grain elevator. At the turn of the century, however, they began to promote other avenues to growth and prosperity, and left waterfront activity in the hands of the financially troubled GTR. They considered tourism, retailing, conventioning, and manufacturing to be more worthy of emphasis, while their counterparts in Saint John launched a concerted effort to capture Portland's winter port trade. The Canadians poured an impressive mix of public and private enterprise into dredging, wharves, warehouses, grain elevators, and a dry dock. Portland elites also won considerable public assistance, but most of it was directed into dredging or military fortifications rather than into modern berthing facilities. Unlike most other port cities, Portland refused to spend public funds on its waterfront. The consequences of these contrasting patterns of local decision-making became more fully apparent after the First World War when Canada's economic boom began to subside. By then Saint John possessed a modern ocean terminal, while the most up-to-date docks in Portland had already become Canadian government property when the Grand Trunk Railway fell into insolvency. For all these reasons the Maine State Pier opened too late to affect the outcome.

Both cities had relied upon a mixture of public and private investment, it should be noted, but it was the nature and timing of public aid rather than the total amounts that spelled the difference in outcomes. Furthermore, public and private capital in Saint John were coordinated and integrated; in Portland they were diffused and scattered.

What light this episode sheds on current discussions about the city's waterfront is left for the reader to decide. George Santayana once said that those who fail to learn the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them. He failed to note that the so-called lessons are usually ambiguous, and different historians often arrive at conflicting interpretations of complex events. Nonetheless we turn to the past for guidance because we have nowhere else to turn. If it is true that Portlanders have commissioned twenty-three different waterfront development plans in the past fifteen years, as Portland City Manager Tim Honey told a Bangor audience recently, then perhaps it is time for them to look at the *history* of their shoreline for a sense of direction.⁶⁶ There is no better place for city officials to begin than at the library of the Maine Historical Society, among the papers of that forgotten friend of Portland's harbor, John Alfred Poor.

NOTES

¹Portland, Maine, Board of Trade, *History of the Board of Trade of Portland, Maine*, comp.: Marshall N. Rich (Portland, Me.: Ford and Rich, 1887), p. 16 (hereafter cited as PBT, *History*); Edward H. Elwell, *Portland and Vicinity*, rev. ed. (Portland, Me.: Loring, Short, and Harmon, 1881), p.17.

²*Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 10, s.v., "Poor, John A." The best source for Poor's life are his rather sparse papers in the Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me. (hereafter cited as MHS), his voluminous pamphlets and memorials bound into two volumes as "Poor's Miscellanies," MHS, and a tribute assembled by his daughter,

Laura Elizabeth Poor, *The First International Railway and Colonization of New England: Life and Writings of John Alfred Poor* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1892).

³Maine State Agricultural Society, *Memorial of the Maine State Agricultural Society for the Adoption of Measures for the Settlement and Sale of the Public Lands of Maine* ([Augusta, Me.]: Stevens and Sayward, [1858], p. 5. This memorial, appearing over the name of John A. Poor and others, was printed as Maine, Legislature, House, Doc. No. 4, [1858], and a copy of it can be found in "Poor's Miscellanies," vol. 2.

⁴*Ibid.*; PBT, *History*, pp. 11-16.

⁵Poor, John A., *Commercial, Railway, and Ship Building Statistics of the City of Portland, and the State of Maine* (Portland, Me.: David Tucker, 1855), p. 35. For a copy see "Poor's Miscellanies," vol. 2.

⁶[Portland] *Board of Trade Journal* 24 (August 1912): 182 (hereafter cited as *BTJ*); *Chamber of Commerce Journal of Maine* 28 (May 1915): 41 (hereafter cited as *CCJM*). In 1915, the *Board of Trade Journal* changed its name to the *Chamber of Commerce Journal of Maine*.

⁷Greater Portland Council of Governments, *Greater Portland Overall Economic Development Program* (Portland, Me.: n.p., 1976), pp. 22-23; Portland, Maine, Planning Dept., *City Edges: Waterfront Improvement Program, Portland, Maine* (Portland, Me.: n.p., 1975), p. 13; Henry F. Merrill, "Historical Sketch of the Port of Portland," in Maine, Portland Port Authority, *The Port of Portland, State of Maine* (Portland, Me.: n.p., [1936]), p. 41. The one recent historical study that argues that Portland adopted a wait-and-see attitude during the competition with Maritime cities for winter port business, a view challenged in this paper, is Allan Jeffrey Wright, "'The Methods of Friendly Approach': Portland, Maine, as Canada's Winter Port" (M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1976).

⁸See Robert H. Babcock, "Economic Development in Portland (Me.) and Saint John (N.B.) during the Age of Iron and Steam, 1850-1914," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 9 (Spring 1979): 3-37.

⁹The Minutes of the Saint John Board of Trade are in the New Brunswick Museum, St. John; I have examined them for the period from 1894 to 1920. The work of the Portland Board of Trade was gleaned from the *BTJ*, 1888-1918, the most complete holding of which can be found at the Bangor Public Library, Bangor, Me.

¹⁰*BTJ* 26 (December 1913): 917; A.W. Currie, *The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 4-6, 61-62, 100, 126; [Bangor] *Industrial Journal*, Jan. 15, 1886, Feb. 25,

March 25, May 6, Nov. 18, 1887 (hereafter cited as *IJ*). The Portland Company extended its credit to the GTR for purchase of rolling stock (see Portland Company, Stockholders' Records, MHS).

¹¹*Ibid.*; *BTJ* 1 (July 1888): 101.

¹²*BTJ* 1 (July 1888): 91, 1 (January 1889): 285. Trade in shooks fell off when West Indian sugar producers changed to bags from boxes (see Maine, Secretary of State, *Statistics of the Industries of Maine for the Year 1886. Fourth Report*. [Augusta, Me.: Sprague and Son, 1886], p. 5); *IJ*, Jan. 15, 1886, April 29, 1887: "More ships would have been sent to Portland . . . had the terminal facilities been greater."

¹³*BTJ* 7 (February 1895): 298-99, 9 (November 1896): 198; Portland Company, Directors' Records, Meeting of Dec. 27, 1893, MHS; Maine, Bureau of Industrial and Labor Statistics, *Eighth Annual Report of the Bureau of Industrial and Labor Statistics for the State of Maine, 1894* (Augusta, Me.: Burleigh and Flynt, 1895), pp. 50-52 (hereafter the Maine Bureau of Industrial and Labor Statistics will be cited as MBILS).

¹⁴On the effects of the ICR see T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1920," *Acadiensis* 1 (Spring 1972): 3-28; Babcock, "Economic Development," pp. 22-23.

¹⁵Murray E. Angus, "The Politics of the 'Short Line'" (M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1958).

¹⁶Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); Edward F. Bush, "The Canadian 'Fast Line' on the North Atlantic, 1886-1915" (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1969), p. 39 (hereafter cited as Bush, "Canadian 'Fast Line'").

¹⁷Bush, "Canadian 'Fast Line,'" pp. 41-49.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 69-74.

¹⁹Saint John Board of Trade, Minutes, March 22, 28; April 2, 3, 25; May 23; June 5, 7; July 3, 16; August 7; Dec. 3, 1894; also Oct. 29, Nov. 5, 6, Dec. 2 (Annual Report), 1895 (hereafter cited as SJB'T, Minutes).

²⁰SJB'T, Minutes, Dec. 18, 27, 1895; Feb. 10, 1896; Aug. 23, Sept. 2, 7, Oct. 24, Nov. 1, 1898; John A. Bowes, "The City's Finances: How Debt and Taxation Are Piling Up in the City of Saint John," *New Brunswick Magazine* 4 (September 1904): 41.

²¹J. W. Daniel, mayor, to Laurier, July 26, 1900, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Provincial Archives of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B. (microfilm copy); SJB'T, Minutes, April 3, 1899.

²²SJB'T, Minutes, Dec. 1, 1899 [pamphlets]; May 23, June 12, 19, 1894; Feb. 5, March 5, May 15, Oct. 15, 1895; May 19, 26, Aug. 3, 28,

Nov. 11, 1903 [Grand Trunk Pacific]; Bush, "Canadian 'Fast Line,'" pp. 81-113. The board adopted scores of resolutions between 1900 and 1908 imploring Ottawa to dredge the harbor.

²³Canada, Parliament, *Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation, Sessional Papers*, 1906, No. 19a, pp. 26-32, 48-49. Hatheway made a "very eloquent speech" before the board on behalf of nationalizing the port (see SJBT, Minutes, Oct. 2, 1906).

²⁴I. J. Isaacs, comp., *The City of Saint John, the Metropolis of New Brunswick, Canada: Its Facilities and Interests* (Saint John, N.B., 1908), p. 23.

²⁵*BTJ* 9 (March 1897): 326.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 10 (May 1897): 6; 10 (February 1898): 294, 298; 12 (May 1899): 9; 12 (February 1900): 294; 13 (November 1900): 207; *Inaugural Address of Hon. Frederic E. Boothby, Mayor, Dec. 9, 1901* (Portland, Me.: Marks Printing House, 1902), p. 35, in Portland, Maine, *Municipal Reports*, 1901.

²⁷*BTJ* 12 (June 1899): 40; 13 (February 1901): 303.

²⁸*BTJ* 10 (September 1897): 138; 15 (November 1902): 204; 16 (July 1903): 70; 17 (February 1905): 484; 19 (January 1907): 443-46.

²⁹*BTJ* 10 (December 1897): 230.

³⁰Between 1900 and 1910 the Grand Trunk spent over \$2 million on its Portland terminus. See *BTJ* 23 (October 1910): 313.

³¹"Record of Harbor Work Done Here Since 1836," *BTJ* 15 (September 1902): 88; "Improvements of Portland Harbor," 15 (December 1902): 239.

³²*BTJ* 10 (January 1898): 270, 273; 10 (April 1898): 359; 12 (February 1900): 305; 16 (February 1904): 375; 13 (February 1901): 220; 26 (June 1913): 681; 15 (December 1902): 236; 15 (April 1903): 362, 366; 18 (August 1905): 239; 20 (June 1907): 105; 20 (November 1907): 316-17.

³³*BTJ* 23 (January 1911): 485.

³⁴*BTJ* 1 (May 1888): 2.

³⁵*BTJ* 10 (April 1898): 365; 12 (December 1899): 234.

³⁶*BTJ* 12 (September 1899): 136; 15 (June 1902): 38; 18 (January 1906): 504; 24 (June 1911): 55.

³⁷*BTJ* 12 (March 1900): 328; 13 (June 1900): 38; 15 (July 1902): 76; 15 (March 1903): 338.

³⁸For an analysis of these changes see Glenn Porter and Harold C. Livesay, *Merchants and Manufacturers: Studies in the Changing Structure of*

Nineteenth-Century Marketing (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

³⁹*BTJ* 16 (May 1903): 19.

⁴⁰*BTJ* 19 (January 1907): 476-77; 20 (May 1907): *passim*; 20 (June 1907): 68; 20 (August 1907): 197.

⁴¹*BTJ* 13 (August 1900): 201; 16 (August 1903): 105-6; 16 (October 1903): 166; 18 (July 1905): 183; 15 (May 1902): 13, 15; 18 (August 1905): 239; 22 (February 1910): 460; 22 (March 1910): 511; 23 (June 1910): 81; 21 (July 1908): 129; 21 (February 1909): 475; 25 (October 1912): 321; 26 (October 1913): 842.

⁴²*BTJ* 18 (July 1905): 119; 21 (June 1908): 63.

⁴³*BTJ* 21 (September 1908): 241-42. "Thirty years ago there were not a dozen summer hotels along the coast; now there are twelve hundred hotels and thousands of cottages." *BTJ* 21 (October 1908): 282.

⁴⁴*BTJ* 22 (August 1909): 157; 23 (April 1911): 655; 24 (May 1911): 4, which reported an increase in the number of tourist letters of inquiry from 1,600 in 1906 to 2,982 in 1909. This rose to over 5,000 by 1911 [24 (July 1911): 159] to over 9,000 by 1913 [26 (September 1913): 750]; 26 (July 1913): 669 (quotation).

⁴⁵A Portland shoe manufacturer discussed this trend in *IJ*, Aug. 26, 1887.

⁴⁶*BTJ* 23 (January 1911): 481; 23 (February 1911): 519; 24 (December 1911): 406; 24 (January 1912): 553; 25 (June 1912): 71-72.

⁴⁷*BTJ* 26 (January 1914): 403-4; *CCJM* 28 (May 1915): 19 (quotation), 21; 29 (November-December 1916): 204. In 1915 the National Biscuit Company chose Portland as its distribution center for northern New England (see *CCJM* 28 [October 1915]: 263).

⁴⁸*BTJ* 15 (February 1903): 300.

⁴⁹*BTJ* 15 (November 1902): 300; 17 (February 1905): 483; 20 (January 1908): 423; 25 (November 1912): 345; 25 (January 1913): 431; 26 (October 1913): 835; 27 (January 1915): 336; *CCJM* 28 (May 1915): 21.

⁵⁰*BTJ* 25 (January 1913): 427; 25 (December 1912): 384; 26 (December 1913): 905; *CCJM* 28 (July 1915): 95.

⁵¹*IJ*, Feb. 24, 1888; *BTJ* 1 (May 1888): 8 (quotation).

⁵²*BTJ* 16 (July 1903): 72. MBILS, *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Industrial and Labor Statistics for the State of Maine, 1904* (Augusta, [Me.]: Kennebec Journal Co., 1905), p. 150; *BTJ* 19 (January 1907): 479.

⁵³*BTJ* 20 (January 1908): 427; 21 (April 1909): 545.

⁵⁴*BTJ* 23 (May 1910): 31; 23 (October 1910): 277-83, 285 (quotation); 23 (January 1911): 471; 471; *CCJM* 28 (May 1915): 19.

⁵⁵*BTJ* 24 (May 1911): 39; 24 (January 1912): 460; 25 (May 1912): 5 (statistics), 151; 26 (October 1913): 822; *CCJM* 29 (July 1916): 93-95; 29 (March 1917): 301; 28 (May 1915): 4.

⁵⁶*BTJ* 23 (January 1911): 476; 24 (September 1911): 251; Portland, Me., *Municipal Reports*, 1911, p. 223; *BTJ* 26 (June 1913): 624.

⁵⁷*BTJ* 27 (January 1915): 331; 26 (October 1913): 821; 26 (November 1913): 864-65.

⁵⁸"Report of the Harbor and Weather Bureau," *BTJ* 26 (January 1914): 411; 27 (January 1915): 335; *CCMJ* 28 (July 1915): 263.

⁵⁹*BTJ* 25 (January 1915): 137 (quotation); *CCJM* 28 (October 1915): 263.

⁶⁰*CCMJ* 29 (June 1916): 56; 30 (May 1917): 375; U.S., Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, *The Ports of Portland and Seaport, Maine and Portsmouth, N.H.* (Washington, 1954), p. 2; Frederic H. Fay, "New State Pier at Portland, Maine," in Maine, Directors of the Port of Portland, *Port of Portland, State of Maine, and Its Hinterland: Being an Orderly Listing of All Port and Terminal Facilities, Including Wharfage, Depth of Water, Width of Channels, Towing...* comp. Clarence E. Day and William E. Meyer [Portland, Me.]: The Directors of the Port of Portland, 1923, pp. 45-46.

⁶¹Maine, State Harbor Commission, *Report upon the Advisability of Building a Public Pier at Portland, December 31, 1918* (N.p., n.d.), 133 pp.

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 8, 29.

⁶³*Ibid.*, pp. 6-7, 10, 44.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 102: Saint John owned fourteen wharves costing \$1,235,000.

⁶⁵Ernest R. Haynes, "The Development of Courtney Bay, Saint John, New Brunswick, 1908-1918" (M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1969); *SJBT*, Minutes, Jan. 2, 1914, Jan. 4, 1915, Jan. 9 1917, Nov. 1, 1920. There is considerable material on this project in the J. D. Hazen papers, Box 16, file 1 (143), Harriet Irving Library, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B.

Exports of Canadian goods from Portland fell from 627,000 short tons in 1923 to 80,000 in 1930. Although the Maine State Pier was expected to be self-liquidating, until 1935 income was sufficient only to cover operating expenses. After World War II it was inadequate even for those costs.

⁶⁶*Bangor Daily News*, March 11, 1982.

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